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Abstract—Smart cities leverage Information and Communi-
cation Technologies (ICTs) to enhance the quality of urban
services. However, it is nowadays clear that the success of a
smart city largely depends on the level of engagement of its
citizens. In this paper we explore to what extent disruptive
blockchain technologies can be used to incentivise the democratic
participation of citizen. The investigated approach extends the
standard IoT cycle 1) sense data, 2) cloudify and elaborate them,
and 3) push information to the users. Here, the user takes an
active role by means of data-informed votes on policies, therefore
influencing behaviours. We illustrate such an approach by means
of a proof-of-concept decentralised application (dApp) supporting
the negotiation of polices for the management of urban water
resources. The dApp consists of a smart contract that manages
the execution of other smart contracts (the policies) according
to the data-driven choices of the community. This use case
demonstrates how suitably blockchain technologies can support
fair and safe access to data and user engagement in smart cities.
Index Terms—Smart cities, Blockchain technologies, IoT,
dApps, Smart Contracts
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart cities integrates a variety of Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICTs) to enhance the quality and
improve the performance of urban services with the main
goal of reducing resource consumption, wastage and overall
costs. Examples of smart cities services include parking and
street maintenance, lighting, traffic control, energy and water
management.
The growing availability of Internet of Thing (IoT) devices
in the cities [5], i.e. embedded devices that can communicate
and interact over the internet and can be remotely monitored
and controlled, allows us to measure and possibly control
a number of heterogeneous urban services and resources.
Thanks to capillary measurements of a variety of phenomena
is nowadays possible to decide actions that can significantly
improve the quality of the life in the city. When executed
collectively by the community of citizens, such actions can
enable a new generation of eco-sustainable smart cities.
While IoT devices are in principle capable of both sensing
and acting on the environment, in many real cases the engage-
ment and collective participation of citizens is still needed to
produce tangible benefits [22], [24].
A. Decentralized management of water resources
Most of the topics discussed in this paper may be applied to
a variety of urban services and related problems. In this paper
we will focus on the management of urban water resources.
Several sources make water management data available. The
interactive statistics portal by the International Water Asso-
ciation (IWA) [6] allows users to compare cities’ differences
regarding water consumption, tariff structure and regulation of
water services. The portal includes data from all 5 continents
from 39 countries and 198 cities. In the following we report
some of the main conclusions driven in 2017 by the expert Jan
Hammenecker, leader of the IWA Working Group Statistics:
• Household consumption of potable water varies from 28
to 631 litres per day per capita, a factor of 20.
• Water taxes that form part of the water bill vary between
0 and 28 percent of the total bill.
• No single tariff structure is trending worldwide. Hamme-
necker said that fixed charges versus variable charges
and environmental charges or not, all have different
advantages and disadvantages.
• Water consumption remains subsidised in many countries
and cities.
• Water pricing is a useful tool for reducing water con-
sumption in times of water scarcity.
The IWA report stresses the importance of adopting modern
emerging technologies of smart metering based on IoT to
accelerate the way to a smart water network. This is further
confirmed by a report by the ITU-T Focus Group on Smart
Sustainable Cities [16] that clarifies the importance of smart
water management in the cities and identifies in the smart
water meters the tools that can give to the citizens the detailed
information they need to conserve water and reduce their bills.
The employment of smart meters as part of IoT deployments
to reduce the water consumption has been investigated in a
number of papers, such as [7], [25].
Figure I-A shows a simplified reference architecture em-
phasizing the main building blocks of a typical IoT system
for water management.
Data on water consumption is collected by smart meters and
delivered to a cloud service allowing live monitoring of the
consumption and providing evidences on consumption patterns
to the users.
One of the goals of this framework is to provide evidence
that may help citizens to better understand their consumption
patterns and consequently act to reduce water consumption.
It is worth noting that the overall success of such resource
management strongly depends on the active and collective par-
Fig. 1. A simplified reference architecture of a typical IoT system for water
management. It is currently based on the centralized Client Server paradigm.
ticipation of citizens. The virtuous behaviour of an individual
is commendable, but the risk is that it is literally “a drop
in the ocean” if not accompanied by the joint action of the
community.
Nowadays, the Client/Server paradigm dominates the cloud
services market. However, blockchain technologies, an emerg-
ing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) decentralised framework, have the
potential to revolutionise this market. After early stages of
development, when blockchain technologies have been mainly
employed in the financial domain, e.g. Bitcoin, nowadays there
is a growing interest in exploring their applicability in other
domains. Decentralized Applications (DApps)1 are a new class
of applications coded in programs running on the blockchain.
DApps may provide a variety of services over the underlying
P2P infrastructure that up to now have only been provided in
Client/Server architectures.
The P2P nature of DApps and the lack of a central authority
as in the Client/Server paradigm, is the key ingredient to
implement infrastructures supporting new forms of democratic
engagement of the citizens.
A recent report by Fluence Labs [13] presents the state
of the DApps ecosystem surviving 160 projects. The main
findings can be summarized in the following points:
• DApps is a modern trend: 72% of the projects started in
2018
• 87% of the projects run on Ethereum
• A quarter of the surveyed projects are gaming DApps.
• About half of the projects used a centralized tools to
connect to the Ethereum blockchain.
• Transactional fees prevailed as the central monetization
model for most projects.
1In this paper we do not enter into the debate on the differences between
DApp and DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organizations).
• New user onboarding was mentioned by more than three
quarters of the respondents as the major obstacle to
adoption.
B. Contribution of the paper
In this paper we present a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) DApp
supporting the active and collective participation of citizens to
resource management, with the specific goal of reducing water
consumption within a smart city context.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how the distin-
guishing features of DApps can actually foster that active and
collective citizen engagement that is key to a real impact.
We will do this by engineering the main building blocks
of a PoC DApp that allows citizens to select policies and
actions to be performed through a democratic voting process.
Besides, engagement is also fostered by a ”fair” incentive
framework, naturally supported by DApps, which can suitably
reward adherence to those behaviours that the community
elects as most beneficial. Technically, we will discuss the
design choices that lead to a decentralised management of
smart contracts implementing water management policies. The
decentralised nature of the architecture guarantees fairness
to all citizens in the decisional process, without dominant
positions or information imbalance.
To the best of our knowledge, the PoC here presented
is an innovative exploitation of the benefits of blockchain
technologies in the context of policy management and citizen
engagement in smart cities.
II. INTRODUCING SMART CONTRACTS FOR POLICY
MANAGEMENT
The reasons for the participation of citizens to a process
can be complex and multi-facet, but at first glance, in a
very simplistic model, there are at least three main reasons:
a) obligation, when the participation is mandated by some
rules or laws, e.g. taxes must be paid; b) convenience, when
there is a tangible or intangible benefit in participating, e.g.
lottery rewards and reputation in open source development;
c) motivational, when people participate because embrace the
ideals of an initiative, e.g. a strike.
Note that these motivations are not mutually exclusive; cit-
izens pay taxes not only because it is mandatory (obligation),
but also because they can take advantage from the services
implemented thanks to their contributions (convenience).
Starting point is to assume the availability of suitable
IoT devices, i.e. smart water meters, capable to measure the
performance of a target process, i.e. reducing water con-
sumption. However, we want then to have citizens engaged
in pursuing behavioural changes. It is well-known that be-
havioural changes are the effective way to better performances
in resource management, e.g. closing the water while brushing
teeth can save up to 20 litres, and taking a shower can save
up to four times the water necessary for a bath.
As observed in [22], smart cities often do not optimally
reach their objectives if the citizens are not suitably involved
in their design. The authors observe that the scientific literature
acknowledges the essential participative role of citizens in
smart cities and argues that the notions of empowerment of
citizens and “democratization” of innovation should be part of
the definition of smart cities.
DApps running on blockchains have the potential to support
new ways of democratic participation and citizen empower-
ment. Noticeably, blockchains introduce decentralised compu-
tation on a P2P network: the (honest) majority of the peers
validates and guarantees the fairness and correctness of the
results of the computation.2 DApps are typically implemented
in the form of smart contracts, i.e. computer programs that
may encode agreements, policies, rules and penalties that
can not be arbitrarily altered once agreed and run on the
blockchain. Beyond automatically enforcing such obligations,
smart contracts can also autonomously transfer digital assets
between parties, e.g. rewards, as stipulated by the content of
the contracts.
Fig. 2. A simplified picture of a DApp for water management. Contrary to
the centralized architecture depicted in I-A the back-end of this architecture is
implemented on smart contracts running on the P2P decentralized blockchain
infrastructure.
To support the active engagement and democratic partici-
pation of users, our proposed DApp will basically implement
two main principles:
• Citizens propose smart contracts that encode measures
of the effectiveness of water management policies. Typi-
cally, such smart contracts relies on IoT data to monitor
the application of policies. Citizens also select a smart
contract by a fair vote. Such smart contracts, capable of
attracting the greater consensus from citizens, becomes
currently operative. Selection may occur regularly, on
demand, or on specific conditions.
• To further encourage the participation of citizens, the
operative smart contract will also be in charge of dis-
2A technical overview of blockchains is out of scope here. The interested
reader is referred to [27]).
tributing incentives to virtuous citizens, namely citizens
that most actively contribute to fulfil policies, i.e. suc-
cessfully reduce the water consumption. Incentives come
from treasury mechanisms, which are out of scope in this
paper (one can imagine a suitably minimal fee). It is
worth noting that when voting for the smart contracts,
citizens actually also select an incentive framework.
We consider two types of smart contracts: the proposal and
the manager.
A proposal smart contract must essentially define a) how to
measure the contribution by each citizen to the reduction of
water consumption as measured by IoT sensors, and b) how
to distribute incentives according to that contribution. Citizens
are free to present proposals, namely alternative solutions that
are democratically voted by the citizens themselves.
The manager smart contract is in charge to a) manage the
interface with IoT sensors and safety of data, b) manage
the voting process at each occurrence of it, and c) make
operational the most voted proposal, which will monitor the
application of policies and devolve incentives accordingly.
Several variations to this general scheme are possibile, of
course, but for the sake of this paper such a general for-
mulation will be adequate. Several technical details about
implementation are discussed in Section III
This form of democratic co-design of policies and rewards
are meant to support the participative process initially
discussed within the context of smart cities: policies, their
success criteria and associated incentives are proposed and
selected bottom-up and are not imposed top-down, thanks
to the innovative features of decentralised computation, as
supported by blockchain technologies. In the following we
sketch two simple examples of smart contracts designed to
encourage and support a sustainable use of the water. Note
that both behaviours relies upon a measurable metric.
• Smart Contract 1: incentives for a user are based on
water meter records of their own home.
• Smart Contract 2: incentives for a user are based on
water meter records of their block within the city.
Smart Contract 1 aims to encourage a virtuous behaviour
at the user level, while Smart Contract 2 aims to encourage
virtuous behaviour within a the group of users living in the
same block. One could imagine that the social implications of
Smart Contract 2 could foster a more collaborative approach to
the common goals. However, the dynamics of DApp induced
social collaborations is scope for future work. Other contracts
combining individual and group level incentives have been
shown to work well for different goals, such as to increase
physical activity [18].
III. IMPLEMENTING SMART CONTRACTS FOR POLICY
MANAGEMENT
The whole process which allows the citizens to select the
smart contract that will become operative can be divided in
three phases: 1) the proposal phase, 2) the selection phase
and 3) the running phase. During the proposal phase, proposal
contracts are submitted by the community. In the selection
phase, proposal contracts are voted by the community among
the proposed ones. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
citizen can access the vote only by providing a fee that is used
to accumulate the incentives. More realistic fee policies are
scope for future work. The voted contract becomes operative in
the running phase, and will actually distribute the accumulated
incentives according to its own policies.
The DApp, whose main components are discussed in the
following, has been developed in Solidity [8], the object-
oriented, high-level language for implementing smart contracts
on Ethereum, using Remix [2], the browser-based compiler
and IDE that enables users to build Ethereum contracts and to
debug transactions.
We used some of the Solidity design and programming pat-
terns collected by Franz Volland in his github repository [23].
A. Prove the correspondence between source code and byte
code of the smart contracts implementing policies
A crucial feature of the proposed DApp is the ability of
proving the correspondence between source code and byte
code of the contracts. In other words, the community of citi-
zens must be able to verify that the proposed smart contracts
and the manager itself will actually behave (byte code) as
supposed (source code).
There are nowadays off-chain services allowing to check
such a correspondence [4]. In section V we will briefly
introduce an interesting line of research aiming at performing
this verification on-chain, i.e. without introducing the need of
trusting centralized services.
B. The manager assumes the ownership of the contracts
during the selection phase
During the proposal phase, users make contract proposals.
In order to participate to the next selection phase, users have to
release contract ownership to the manager smart contract. This
is done by implementing the Access Restriction pattern which
allows the ownership of a contract to be changed. The proposer
invokes the changeOwner function (see listing 1), providing
asinput the address of the manager that consequently becomes
the owner. We stress here that at each instant in time there is
only one owner for a contract. Some functions of the contract
may be invoked by the owner only.
The template code by Volland also supports the acquisition
of contract ownership by anybody for 1 ether after a month has
passed since the last change in ownership. We do not exploit
this function that however shows the versatility of the proposed
pattern in supporting heterogeneous criteria for changing the
ownership of a contract.
Listing 1. The function to change the ownership of the contract. Note that
only the current owner can change the ownership.
f u n c t i o n changeOwner ( a d d r e s s newOwner )
p u b l i c onlyBy ( owner )
{
owner = newOwner ;
}
C. Handling the different states of a proposal and the corre-
sponding functions
In each phase, a proposal contract can be in one of two
possible states: selection and running. Only the owner of a
contract can change the status of a contract.
The State Machine pattern [23] allows a contract to go
through different states, with different functions enabled in
different states. It implements the Access Restriction pattern
described above (see listing 2). A function modifier checks
if the contract stage is equal to the required stage before
executing the called function. Note that the manager, becoming
the owner of the contracts, is the only one capable to change
the state of a contract during the selection phase.
Listing 2. Managing the states of a proposed contract.
enum S t a g e s {
P r o p o s a l ,
S e l e c t i o n ,
Run
}
S t a g e s p u b l i c s t a g e = S t a g e s . P r o p o s a l ;
m o d i f i e r a t S t a g e ( S t a g e s s t a g e ) {
r e q u i r e ( s t a g e == s t a g e ) ;
;
}
f u n c t i o n r u n c o n t r a c t ( ) p u b l i c
a t S t a g e ( S t a g e s . r u n n i n g ) {
/ / Here t h e c o n t r a c t e x p o s e s
/ / a l l t h e f u n c t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o
/ / a ) measure t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n
/ / o f each c i t i z e n t o t h e
/ / r e d u c t i o n o f w a t e r consumpt ion
/ / b ) d i s t r i b u t e t h e i n c e n t i v e s
/ / a c c o r d i n g t o t h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n
}
Such a template allows more complex behaviour combining
both stage transitions and timed transitions to be taken into
consideration.
D. Voting for the contracts in the selection phase
During the selection phase, the manager implements a
voting application. In this case, the Contract template provided
by the the Solidity documentation has been used [3]. The main
differences being:
1) voters not only express their preferences on the proposed
contracts but must also provide a minimum amount of
currency to sustain the incentives that will be distributed
in the running phase;
2) the manager calls the winningProposal function after a
given amount of time to conclude the selection phase;
3) the winning contract changes its status from selection to
running;
4) the manager transfers all the accumulated funding to the
winning contract
While the voting template would also support a form of
liquid democracy, we do not consider here for the moment
the possibility of voting with delegation.
E. Collecting data from the smart meters, i.e. interacting with
the IoT
Once in a running state, the winning smart contract needs
to collect data from the smart meters to correctly dispense
incentives to the users. This requires the communication with
an Oracle, a centralisation point, to gain access to data outside
the blockchain. An Oracle is hence a trusted entity providing
a unique view on a source of data considered credible.
Each node in the blockchain has to validate every com-
putation performed in a smart contract. When this requires
the interaction with off-chain sources of data, as in our case
with smart meters, this becomes unpractical because, due to
network issues (e.g. delays), there are not guarantee that all
the node will access the same information as expected thus
leading to a possible break in the consensus algorithm.
In our PoC, we use the oracle service provided by Ora-
clize [1], see listing 3 (recently Oraclize changed its name to
Provable).
Listing 3. The call of an Oracle to acquire the water meter readings.
c o n t r a c t Wate r Orac l e i s u s i n g O r a c l i z e {
s t r i n g p u b l i c WATER;
f u n c t i o n ge tWate rConsumpt ion ( )
p u b l i c p a y a b l e {
i f ( o r a c l i z e g e t W C ( ”URL” ) >
t h i s . b a l a n c e ) {
/ / Handle o u t o f f u n d s e r r o r
} e l s e {
o r a c l i z e q u e r y ( ”URL” , ” API ” ) ;
}
}
f u n c t i o n c a l l b a c k ( s t r i n g r e s u l t )
p u b l i c {
r e q u i r e ( msg . s e n d e r ==
o r a c l i z e c b A d d r e s s ( ) ) ;
WATER = r e s u l t ;
}
}
The function getWaterConsumption() is sending out the
query to the oracle. The payable modifier is necessary because
the Oraclize service is not for free.
If the balance is sufficient, the query is sent to the Oraclize
contract. The first parameter tells the oracle that we want to
query a URL while the second parameter contains the URL
of the API providing the data we are interested in.
The callback function is used by the oracle to respond
providing the required data which are stored in the public
variable WATER. The value of WATER is finally used to
distribute the incentives.
IV. RELATED WORK
A privacy-friendly blockchain-based gaming platform aim-
ing at engaging users in reducing water or energy consumption
at their premises is proposed in [20]. In this paper users
participation is achieved by gamification, the concept of smart
contract is not considered and the blockchain is used to
implement an authenticated storage capable to collect secure
commitments by the meters and thus avoiding cheating.
The literature on blockchain technologies in the smart cities
has been recently reviewed in [21]. The paper analyses a
number of sectors where the blockchain can contribute to build
a smarter city such as: governance and citizen engagement,
education, culture, science and innovation, well-being, health
and safety, economy, transportation, energy, built environment,
natural environment, water management.
Our approach well fit into the governance and citizen en-
gagement sector. This sector can be analyzed considering four
governance models [15]: the most conservative is the govern-
ment of a smart city in which the governance is implemented
by traditional governmental structures. The smart decision
model leverages big data to support the decisions, thus requir-
ing some kind of restructuring at the decision process level,
but not at the organizational level. The smart administration
model adopts ICTs to interconnect information, processes,
institutions, organizations and physical infrastructures to better
serve citizens. Finally the most transformative smart urban
collaboration entails the proactive participation of the citizens
to the governance of the city. The authors stress that lack of
transparency and trust on a centralized network infrastructure
could be a key factor that hinders the true realization of the
citizen participatory governance model. Our proposed DApp is
an example of smart urban collaboration implemented over a
P2P network thus overcoming most of the limits of traditional
centralized networks and guaranteeing an unprecedented level
of transparency and trust. In the blockchain, the trust shift
from a single and centralized third party to the whole P2P
infrastructure, that is decentralized in its nature.
E-governance models for the smart cities usually rely on
cloud architectures (similar to the one represented in figure
I-A) which are nowadays monopolized by a few companies
serving as central and trusted authorities. Blockchain has the
potential to change this situation, and it is thus considered
a core technology to democratize and dis-intermediate the
governance processes. However, despite such premises, prac-
tical employments of e-government processes truly based on
blockchain solutions, such as [14], are still very limited.
The rules and procedures for the governance of blockchain-
based systems can be implemented both “on-chain” and “off-
chain” [19].
In on-chain governance, the rules and the processes are
encoded directly into the underlying infrastructure of a
blockchain-based system. In other words, “the code is the
law” and all the interactions to carry out the governance of a
system are determined by rules and processes encoded within
the underlying blockchain code.
There are a number of projects (e.g. Decred, Dash, Bit-
shares, Steemit, and Cardano) that have integrated on-chain
governance as a core functionality of their platform, not only
to govern blockchain based system, but also to govern the
blockchain itself mostly by allowing to change the existing
protocol and parameters of the blockchain and to retroactively
make changes to its state.
Off-chain governance comprises all other (i.e. non-on-chain)
rules and decision-making processes that might affect the
operations and the future development of blockchain-based
systems.
Our proposed approach is an example of a blockchain-
based application providing on-chain governance. However,
we do not aim at changing the core rules and functions of the
blockchain, rather we simply take advantage of the existing
infrastructure, as it is, to govern a process by a smart contract.
In a traditional organization, a group of humans usually
organized in a hierarchical structure, interacts in person and
control the assets of the organization off-chain via the legal
system. In a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization),
a group of people interacts according to a protocol specified
in code and enforced on the decentralized blockchain. In this
context, the code is the law and consequently the organization
can autonomously run without the need of an interaction in
person. The distinction between DApp and DAO is beyond the
scope of this paper and while very controversial the two terms
are used interchangeably sometimes.
However, the concept of DAO is often associated to the most
dramatic event in the story of the decentralized applications
running on the blockchain.
“The DAO” [10], [9] has been a concrete attempt to
implement a funding platform, similar to Kickstarter, as a
DAO running over Ethereum. The DAO went live in 2016
with between 10-20 thousand investors (estimation) providing
the equivalent of about US$ 250 million in funding and thus
breaking all existing crowdfunding records. However, after
few months an unintended behavior of the DAOs code was
exploited draining the fund of millions of dollars worth of
ETH tokens.
Immediately, the leaders of the Ethereum platform and other
stakeholders reacted implementing “external, traditional and
unforeseen in the code” defence strategies not implementable
by the original code of The DAO, thus breaking the main
principle behind a DAO, namely “code is law”. In the end,
the whole project was abandoned dealing to a controversial
“hard fork” the consequence of which are well summarized in
Table 1 of [10]
Voting is considered among the most important application
of the blockchain technology in the public sector [12]. In our
proposed approach, voting is used to select which among the
proposed contracts will become actually operative. Clearly,
a fully aware vote in our proposed approach requires the
understanding of smart contracts and their implications. It
is worth recalling that in several cases, e.g. the infamous
DAO [10], [9], buggy or even malicious smart contracts
couldn’t be easily identified even by experts. To support the
participation of non-experts, a form of liquid democracy can
be implemented. Liquid democracy is a modern approach to
voting in which voters can either vote directly or delegate their
vote to other voters, who in turn can further delegate. [11],
[26].
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The success of smart cities initiatives relays on the collective
and active participation of the citizens. Most of ongoing smart
cities projects have exploited well ICT, and IoT in particular,
to monitor a variety of urban services and process, but they do
not have fully explored to what extent ICT can also support
the necessary participation of citizens.
In this paper we discussed the possible advantages of
deploying the smart city services as DApps running on de-
centralized blockchains. The main expected impact of such
approach in terms of user participation can be summarized in
the following points:
• Moving from a centralized Client/Server architecture,
typical of current implementations of smart city service,
to DApps will remove the necessity of trusting central
authorities, which is considered one of the most relevant
factors that limit the true realization of citizen participa-
tory governance [15].
• The voting process implemented in the proposed DApp
will contribute to democratize the policy management
process. Such a democratization [22] will actually result
in greater participation of citizens.
• The distribution of incentives collected by the community
to reward the virtuous behaviour of the citizens can
possibly further encourage their participation.
While the presented PoC demonstrates the technical feasibility
of the proposed approach, there are still a number of issues to
be considered for the possible deployment of a testbed.
In [13] it is clearly shown that the main problems of ongoing
DApp initiatives is how to attract new users. Even if in that
report a quarter of the surveyed projects were gaming DApps,
a completely different domain with respect to our proposed
one, a critical aspect is to demonstrate that indeed the points
mentioned above will actually motivate a greater participation
of the citizens.
In general, we should also demonstrate that the encoding
in the smart contract of the policies and rewards is not only
technically possible, but also suitable. What is the fraction
of the population that can actually encode a proposal in a
smart contract? What is the fraction of the population capable
to understand a smart contract? Those are two fundamental
questions we should answer to better understand the possibly
impact of the proposed approach. If the majority of the
population will actually be (made) able to both formulate
and understand policy proposals, this approach will possibly
contribute to the realization of a new form of direct democracy.
Otherwise, the risk is to build a technocracy in which the
power is in the hands of the few that understand the technol-
ogy. Anyway, as already observed, the liquid democracy can
be the answer to delegate the vote to trusted, more educated
parties,reaching in this way the right compromise between the
direct and representative democracy.
From a more technical point of view, we plan to evaluate
the gas usage of the function calls and the delay in the
transaction confirmation, similarly to what has been done
in [17]. However, we do not expect this aspect to be critical
for a successfully deployment of the proposed approach if in-
centives will be appealing enough to motivate the participation
of the citizens and, at the same time, allow for the necessary
costs to run the infrastructure to be paid.
An interesting technical issue we want to explore is the
implementation of an on-chain system capable to prove the
correspondence between the source code of a smart contract
and its byte code (see section III-A). Interestingly, most
of the proposed approach to tackle this issue rely on off-
chain services. The idea is to explore a more fundamentalist
approach in which a smart contract can provide this service.
At a first analysis, this should require the ability of a smart
contract (the verifier) to compile another smart contract (the
verified), a function that to the best of our knowledge is not
yet supported by Solidity.
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